Steve Ely

Patron privacy, professional principles, and Taranto’s tripe

A few days ago, my mother sent me an article about a librarian in Vermont who drew some attention when police sought to seize the computers from the public library where she works and she required a court order first.  This seemed pretty basic to me.  As a commenter of Jessamyn West’s notes, police need the library’s computers to solve a crime, they get a search warrant, they get the computers.  Done.  “Seems pretty simple.”  I guess it should be obvious by now, though, that many in America today view warrants as just a contemptible and offensive nuisance.  Today, my mom sent me a James Taranto column that illustrates this.

Taranto is disgusted that anyone would require a court order before handing over whatever library records or computers police might ask for.  He asserts that actual patrons don’t hold any expectation or concern for privacy in their library usage.  He claims further that librarians are only motivated to protect patron privacy because of pretensions to professional prestige equal to doctors and lawyers.  He characterizes Juidth Flint, the librarian in the story, as “a bureaucrat,” perhaps because of her demand for a warrant.   He claims that because state law in Vermont didn’t yet require her to demand it, she was therefore “acting on her own discretion” and “on her own authority.”

I was at first struck by Taranto’s view that patrons don’t actually care about privacy and that librarians who treat patron activity as protected have an overinflated sense of their own importance.  I’d argue that Taranto has contempt here not just for librarians but for libraries and ultimately their users.  He can brush aside the idea that librarians claim a concern for patron privacy rights for any reason other than “status envy” because he dismisses out of hand the concept that individuals might prefer for their specific information pursuits not to become public knowledge.  That library users have no interest in keeping private the details of their usage is simply an assumption Taranto makes because it’s convenient to him in his attack on a profession that’s annoyed him.  (Not that he allows us to think for a moment he regards librarians as professional.)

He insults Judith Flint even more than librarians in general, of course, but, more to the point, when he says “Flint was acting on her own discretion in demanding a warrant,” he’s lying.  The AP article he links says specifically “The library’s policy was to require [a court order].”  Perhaps he’d like to criticize the library’s policy, or even criticize the librarian for adhering to it.  (And why not criticize her for adhering to policy, Mr. Taranto?  After all, if people are going to obey existing policies requiring warrants, next they’ll expect the president to obey existing laws requiring warrants, such as the pre-2007 FISA, and only a crazed leftist would want that.)  But he could make that criticism (which I still wouldn’t agree with but would respect more) without distorting or lying about the situation for the sake of his cheap shot.

I’m OK with letting certain policies slide.  If the policy is “no food in the library,” and you bring some food in, I may let it slide if it doesn’t seem like a big deal.  If the policy is no cell-phone use in the library and you answer your phone, I may let it slide for a couple of minutes if you’re being quiet, trying to keep it short, and not really bothering anyone.  But a degree of flexibility on some things doesn’t suggest library policies ought mean nothing.  If the library enacts a policy of “no disclosure of data about patron library usage without a court order,” and a librarian respects that policy in just the sort of circumstance it was enacted specifically for, she’s not “acting on her own authority,” and it doesn’t make her a jerk.

I’d actually be very intrigued if there’s an instance in which Taranto ever defends any privacy rights rather than attacking those who do.

Two other interesting questions raised here are 1. To what extent have library patrons voiced a concern for privacy and to what extent has a principle about that arisen for any other reason, including Taranto’s explanation of “status envy” and 2. To what extent do librarians generally suffer from status envy and seek the same respect society accords doctors and lawyers.  This may have a kernel of truth to it.  I think I may have seen some instances, but it’s not automatically true as a consequence of the word “profession,” and the flat of assertion of it without evidence is shabby at best.  Judith Flint, certainly, is no such evidence.